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ABSTRACT
Our purpose in this paper is to examine howone might
evaluate and measure the contribution of publicinfrastructure
capital on private sector output and productivitygrowth in
Sweden. We do this by specifying and implementingempirically a
numberofalternative econometric models, using annual data for
Sweden from 1960 to 1988.
Using a dual cost function approach, we find that increases
in public infrastructure capital, ceterisoaribus, reduce private
sector costs. We compute that amount of public infrastructure
capital that would rationalize the cost savings incurredby the
private business and manufacturing sectors, and find thatthe
amount that can be rationalized in this manner is less thanwhat
was in fact available in 1988, but that the extent ofexcess
public infrastructure capital has been falling in the 1980's.
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I. Introduction
Although much attention in macroeconomics has been focusedon the
effects of goverrunent spending on private sectoroutput and productivity
growth, and even though private sector capital accumulation haslong been
studied in terms of its effects on economic growth and
productivity,
surprisingly little consideration has been given to thecorresponding effects
of public infrastructure capital stock formation.By public infrastructure
capital stocks, we refer to the highways, airports, mass transit
facilities,
water supplies, sewer systems, police and fire stations, courthousesand
public garages, etc., that provide an environment in whichprivate production
is facilitated.
As David Aschauer (1989] and Alicia Munnell [1990a,b],among others,
have recently emphasized, this relative neglect of publicinfrastructure
capital is particularly startling, for the amount of such infrastructure
capital is substantial, both absolutely and relatively.1 Munnell[1990a,
Table 3], for example, reports that in 1987 in the UnitedStates, the value of
the total private (nonfarm business plus farm) capital stockwas $4.1 trillion
dollars, while the total non-military public infrastructurecapital stock was
$1.9 trillion •-about461 of the private sector stock. For Sweden, our
estimate of the private business sector capital stock in 1988 is 817billion
SEX, while that for the public infrastructure capital stock is 355 billionSEX
about 43% of the private sector stock. In both countries, infrastructure
capital is substantial.
Government investments in long-lived capital equipment andbuildings
undoubtedly provide valuable infrastructure services for the private business
sector, as well as for individual consumers. The construction of new roads,PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Page2 -
orthe maintenance and upkeep of existing highways, for example, can havea
substantial impact on the time required to transport goods and services, and
to conduct other business affairs. Thus it is reasonable to expect that
public sector infrastructure capital formation has a significant impact on the
performance and productivity of the private sector.2
Table 1
Growth Rates of Real Private and Real Public Capital Stocks
in Sweden and in the United States, Selected Time Periods
Average Annual Growth Rate of Capital Stock
Private Business Sector: 1960-88 1960-73 1974-88
Sweden 3.8% 4.7% 3.0%
United States 3.4% 4.3% 3.1%
Core Infrastructure:
Sweden 2.6% 4.1% 1.3%
United States 2.6% 4.1% 1.4%
Core Infrastructure
Excluding Electricity:
Sweden 2.3% 4.8% 0.0%
Note: Data for Sweden computed by authors. For the United States, data are
averages of values reported by Alicia Munnell [1990aJ, Table 4, p. 15.
In this context, it is of interest to examine relative growth rates of
capital accumulation in the private and public sectors of Sweden and the
United States. As is shown in Table 1, surprisingly similar trends have
occured in these two countries since 1960, with both revealing a rather sharp
slowdown in public infrastructure capital formation in the 1970's. More
specifically, over the 1960-88 time period, the annual average growth rate
(AACR) of real capital stocks in the private sector was 3.8% in Sweden andPUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -pag•3-
3.41in the US; the 1974-88 AACR for Sweden (3.01) and the US(3.11) were both
less than that from 1960-73 (4.71 for Sweden and 4.3Z for theUs).
Since 1973, however, growth of the public infrastructurecapital stock
has lagged considerably behind that in the privatesector, both in theUSand
Sweden. While the AACRfrom1960-73 for core infrastructure capital (high-
ways, airports, mass transit, electric and gas plants, telecommunications,
water supply facilities and sewers) was substantial at 4.11 in bothcountries,
growth fell sharply to 1.31 (Sweden) and 1.41 (US) from 1974 to 1988. And if
one excludes electricity generation and distribution investments from thecore
capital, in Sweden the growth rate of infrastructure capital since 1974 is
0.01 --zero.
The rough coincidence of this slowdown in public infrastructurecapital
formation with the much-discussed decline in productivitygrowth in both these
countries is striking. A back of the envelope calculation reveals further
that the simple correlation between annual multifactorproductivity growth in
Sweden's private business sector and the growth rate of its public
infrastructure capital stock from 1961 to 1988 is 0.55, while that between
productivity growth and the growth rate of this infrastructure stock lagged
one year is 0.65.Is there in fact a relationship between public infra-
structure capital formation and the productivity growth slowdown in Sweden?
Or, as has been conjectured by Charles Schultze [1990], is this correlation
simply a temporal coincidence, without any cause-effect implications?
Ourpurposein this paper is to examine how one might evaluate and
measure the contribution of public infrastructure capital on private sector
output and productivity growth. We do this by specifying and implementing
empirically a number of alternative econometric models using annual data for
Sweden from 1960 to 1988.PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Page4 -
Theoutline of this paper is as follows. In Section II we beginby
summarizing and critiquing the theoretical framework and empirical results
reported in several recent studies of public infrastructure capital formation
based on US data. In Section III we provide an alternative theoretical
framework, using modern duality theory. Then in Section IV we discuss
measurement issues and econometric implementation. In Section V we report
empirical results for the total private business sector in Sweden, and in
Section VI we focus on the manufacturing sector only. Finally, in Section VII
we present a summary of our findings and provide suggestions for future
research.
II.Brief Review of Literature
The literature on modeling the contribution of public infrastructure
capital to economic growth is substantial; much of it is in the context of
regional economics and economic development.3 A common specification in this
literature is that of a production function relating value-addedoutput Q to
the quantities of labor input L, private capital input5, and public
infrastructure capital K:
Q —F(L,5, K1). (1)
In an early theoretical article, James E. Meade l952], develops a
specification in which it is assumed that F is homogeneous of degree one in
all inputs L, 5 and K1. Since by assumptionKi affects Q, and since it is
exogenous to the firm but does not directly receive a factor payment from the
firm, Meade calls this specification an "unpaid factor" model. Another
specification considered by Meade is one where F is homogeneous of degree one
in only the private inputs L and5, and in which the marginal product of the
public infrastructure capital is positive; Meade calls this an "atmosphere"PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Page5
model.Inthis atmosphere model, returns to scale over all inputs are
typicallyincreasing, although they are constant over private inputs. A third
possibility, of course, is one in which no constraints are placed on the
homogeneity of the F function, implying no restrictions on returns to scale.4
At this point it is worth remarking that relatively few empirical
studies have been reported in the literature that incorporate public
infrastructure capital Kj as an input into production or cost functions. An
implication of this is that in most studies the K measure is an omitted
variable, and that therefore the resulting estimates of private returns to
scale may suffer from an omitted variable bias. What the sign of this bias is
cannot be stated in general, for it depends on the specific representation of
the production or cost function. An intriguing question thatemerges,
however, is whether the recent spurt of literature on economic growth
emphasizing the existence of increasing returns to scale for private inputs,
is based in large part on such an omitted variable bias.5
Although most of public infrastructure literature is theoretical, a
number of econometric studies have been undertaken. Among the more recent
analyses, those by David A. Aschauer (1989J and Alicia H. Munneil [1990a,b}
are of particular interest to us. We now briefly summarize their findings.
Aschauer assumes that the production function in (1) is Cobb-Douglas.
and he estimates parameters for all three of the returns to scale specifica-
tions noted above. Moreover, he adds to the estimating equation a time
counter variable "t"toincorporate the effects of disembodied technical
progress, and a capacity utilization variable CU. For his specification with
no constraints placed on returns to scale, Aschauer estimates parameters of
the equation
in Q -hi —+ a1•lnL +a2•lnK +a3•lnKj +PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Page6 -
a4•lnCU +a5't+u (2)
wherein is the natural logarithm, u is a traditional stochastic disturbance
term, and the degree of returns to scale over all inputs is equal toa1 +a2+
a3+1.Aschauer also derives and estimates a productivity equationhaving
the form
ln A —b0+b1•lnL +b2•lnK +b3•].nKi +b4•].nCU +b5t+v (3)
where A is the normalized level of inultifactor productivitycomputed from a
Divisia index of growth in output Q minus growth in the privateinputs L and
and v is a random disturbance term. Note that Meade'sunpaid factor and
atmosphere models are testable special cases of (2) and (3).
Aschauer's measure of Ki is the net stock of non-military public
structures and equipment, which is based on values presented in a US
Department of Commerce publication, Fixed Reproducible Tannible Wealth 1925-
K includes federal, state and local capital stocks of equipment and
structures. Annual data on US private business sector output Q, hours L,
private capital K. and multifactor productivity A are obtained from the US
Department of Labor publications Monthly Labor Review, while thecapacity
utilization measure is from the federal Reserve Bulletin and is restrictedto
the manufacturing sector of the US economy. Based on this 1949-85 annual
data, Aschauer reports results of estimating equation (2) as:
ln Q -inK —-5.60+0.29•inL -0.44•lnK.1, +0.36•ln (4)
(10.90)(3.04) (7.95) (9.79)
+O.451nCU +0.OiO•t R2 —0.977SER —0.0078
(11.31) (4.46) DW —1.74
where absolute values of t-statistjcs are in parentheses, SERisthe standard
error of the regression and DW is the Durbin-Watson test statistic. Note that
the 0.36 coefficient on in K1 is positive and statisticallysignificant, and
that it implies that if public infrastructure capital were increasedby 1%,PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Page7 -
ceterisparibus, the private business sector output would increase by O.36X.
Estimated returns to scale are 1.21. but the null hypothesis ofconstant
returns to scale in all inputs (Meade's unpaid factor model) cannot be
rejected at usual significance levels. The implied elasticity of output with
respect to labor is 0.29. while that with respect to private capital is 0.56
(-0.44 + I); the relative values of these two elasticities differ
considerably
from the wconventional wisdoaN, in which the ratio of the L to5 output
elasticities is typically 3:1, not 1:2.6
A related set of empirical efforts have been reported by Alicia Munnell.
As in Aschauer, in Munneli [1990aJ it is assumed that the production function
is Cobb-Douglas, but CU rather than in CU is added as aregressor, and the t
variable is not included. When no constraints are placed on returns toscale,
Munnell's estimating equation is of the form
in Q -inL —c0+ c1•ln L + c2•ln 5 + c3'ln K + c4•CU + (5)
where c is a random disturbance term that follows a first-orderautoregressive
(AR1)process.Returns to scale over all inputs equal c1 +c2 + c3 + 1.
Munneil considers twoalternativemeasures of non-military K, both
based on the same data sources employed by Aschauer. One is what she calls
the Ncore infrastructure capital, and it consists of highways, airports,mass
transit facilities, electric and gas plants, water supply facilities and
sewers; a second measure is more general, and it includes not only the core
infrastructure capital, but also non-military public buildings such as
schools, hospitals, police and fire stations, courthouses, garages and
passenger terminals, and those used in conservation and development. In 1987,
about 63X of the total non-military public capital consisted of core
infrastructure, education, hospital and other buildings constituted about 28%,
and conservation and development structures provided the remaining 9%.PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Page8 -
Using1949-1987 annual data for the US private nonfartobusiness sector
andthe total nonmilitary public capital measure for K, Munnellreports
estimates of (5) as:
in Q -InL —4.45-l.02'lnL +O.64•inK +0.3l•lnK1 +0.66.CU,(6)
(7.3) (4.4) (4.1) (3.2) (5.8)
having an R2 of 0.998, a SERequalto 0.0099, and an estimate of the first-
order autocorrelation coefficient equal to 0.74, with a t-statistic of 4.7.
Very similar results were obtained when the K1 measure was confined to the
core infrastructure capital. Specifically, Munnell reports estimates as:
in Q -inL —4.37-1.06•lnL +0.62•lnK +0.37•lnKi +0.68•CU (7)
(6.9) (4.5) (4.0) (3.9) (5.8)
with an K2 of 0.998, SER—0.0096and an estimate of p —0.67,with a t-
statisticof 3.9. Hence the two estimates of the elasticity of output (or,
average labor productivity) with respect to K1 range from 0.31 to 0.37, very
close to the 0.36 estimate reported by Aschauer. Although point estimates of
returns to scale over all inputs are 0.92 for the more inclusive measure ofK1
and 0.93 for core infrastructure, the null hypothesis of constant returns to
scale is not rejected at usual significance levels. The implied elasticities
of output with respect to labor input in (6) and (7) are -0.02 and -0.06,
respectively, while those with respect to private capital input are 0.64 and
0.62; the negative values for the labor elasticity are of course unreasonable,
and the relatively large value for the private capital output elasticities is
at sharp variance with conventional wisdom.
More reasonable results are obtained in Munnell [1990b], where the
underlying data are pooled cross-section annual time series for the 48
continental states over the 1970-1988 time period. The Ki data is "core
infrastructure" state and local capital and it includes cumulated and
depreciated government capital outlays defined as direct expenditures for thePU5LIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN Page 9 -
constructionof buildings, roads and other improvements, including additions,
replacements, and major alterations to fixed works and structures, whether
contracted privately or built directly by the government; these outlays
encompass highways, sewage and water supply facilities, but exclude all
federal government, and in particular, all military expenditures.
Munnell estimates an equation similar to (6) with the state's
unemployment rate replacing the CU variable and with the dependent variable
being in Q rather than in Q -inL:
in Q —d0+d1.inL +d2•inK., +d3•inKi +d4•UN+v, (8)
and with the three alternative returns to scale specifications. In the
unrestricted version analogous to (4), returns to scale are equal to d1 +d2+
d3.Munnell reports OLS estimates of the unrestricted equation as follows:
in Q —5.75+0.59•inL +0.3l•ln+O.15•lnK -0.007UN (9)
(39.7) (43.2) (30.1) (9.0) (4.7)
where t-statistics are in parentheses; the R2 is 0.993, and the standard error
of the regression is 0.088. The implied elasticity of output with respect to
infrastructure capital is 0.15, which is positive and statistically
significant, but is considerably smaller than the 0.31 .0.39estimates
reported in the studies by Munnell (1990a] and Aschauer (1989J discussed
above, each of which employed national data. Note that the estimated returns
to scale from this model are 0.59 +0.31+0.15—1.05,which implies
increasing returns to scale. When Meade's "atmosphere" returns to scale
restrictions are imposed (d1 +d2—1),the fit is only marginally affected
(the R2 fails to 0.992 and the SER increases to 0.090), but when Meade's
"unpaid factor" returns to scale constraints are introduced (d1 +d2+d3
—
1),the goodness of fit declines considerably (the R2 is 0.990, but the SER
increases to 0.102). Munneil reports similar findings when the infrastructurePUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Page10 -
capitalis disaggregated into stock of highways, stock of water and sewer
systems, and stock of other state and local public capital (primarily
buildings). Finally, the value of the elasticity of output with respect to
labor input (0.59) relative to that with respect to private capital (0.31) is
more in line with the conventional wisdom, although the 0.59/0.31 ratio is
still less than 3:1.
One implication of the use of the Cobb-Douglas functional form in these
studies is that the L, Ki and 5 inputs are assumed to be substitutable
inputs, implying that increases in Kj are by assumption specified to increase
the average and marginal productivity of the labor and private capital inputs.
In an effort to gain more information about substitutability relationships
among inputs, Munnell estimated parameters of a translog production function,
a functional form more general than the Cobb-Douglas. Although she does not
report estimates of substitution elasticities, she interprets OLS parameter
estimates of the translog model as implying that 5 and L are strongly
substitutable inputs, that 5 and Ki are weakly substitutable, and that Ki and
L are complementary (although the relationship is not statistically
significant).
The studies by Aschauer and Munnell generate provocative and intriguing
findings, but they suffer from a number of serious drawbacks. First, in the
literature on cost and production, the highly restrictive Cobb-Douglas
functional form is hardly ever employed anymore, and instead more flexible
functional forms are used. Second, there is a serious issue of what is
endogenous and what is exogenous, and the extent to which the production
function estimates -- Cobb-Douglasor translog -- sufferfrom a simultaneous
equations bias. Specifically, the right-hand variables in the various
equations estimated by Aschauer and Munnell include measures of labor inputPUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Fag.11 -
(hourspaid) and utilization (either capacity utilization or state
unemployment rate), and strong arguments have been made that in this typeofa
context such variables should be treated as endogenous, not exogenous; in such
a case estimation by OLSproducesbiased and inconsistent parameter
estimates.7 Third and finally, although this approach provides one measure of
the impact of Ki on private sector costs and productivity, it does not provide
a framework in which one can begin to assess whether the amount of K is
insufficient or excessive.
A more appropriate approach, we believe, is to follow developments of
the last two decades in modern duality theory and to specify a variable cost
function dual to a production function -- acost function that reflects the
optimizing behavior of individual firms.8 In the present context, for
example, one can specify a variable cost function for the private sector in
which firms are envisaged as attempting to produce a given level of output at
minimum private variable cost, conditional on quantities of fixed inputs such
as Kj and perhaps K.1,, where private variable costs include labor, and perhaps
energy and other non-energy intermediate materials. In the next section, we
outline this alternative theoretical framework, and show how it permits us to
measure benefits of public infrastructure capital, or more precisely, how to
obtain measures of the shadow value of this capital.
III. An Alternative Theoretical Framework
In the economic theory of cost and production, the notion of a
production function plays a central role. Essentially, a production function
is an engineering notion revealing the maximum possible output Q that can be
produced within a time period, given quantities of the inputs x1, x2,...,x.
A useful way of viewing the production function relationship is to think of itPUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Page12 -
asa book whose pages contain alternative blueprint designs for combining
inputs to produce output level Q. Clearly, the production function and the
book of blueprints must be consistent with laws of nature and other
engineering relationships. While laws of nature are by definition stable and
do not change over time, our understanding and discovery of these laws, as
well as our ability to exploit technological possibilities, has improved with
time. One way of accounting for such advances in the state of technical
knowledge, therefore, is to think of them as adding new pages to the book of
blueprints. For such reasons, often a time counter variable "t" is included
in the production function relationship.
Economic content can be added to the notion of a production function if
one assumes that firms optimize. In particular, assume that the prices of
inputs purchased by the firm are given (call these prices p), and that
conditional on the level of output Q and other environmental factors beyond
the firm's control, called Z (including the state of technical knowledge t,
but also other variables), firms choose quantities of the inputs so as to
minimize the private costs of producing output Q. Given standard continuity
and regularity conditions on the production function, according to modern
duality theory there exists a cost function dual to the production function,
having the general form
C —g(Q,p,Z) (10)
where C is the total private cost of purchasing the input quantitiesxj at
prices Pj. The dual cost function is increasing in Q and in p, and is
homogeneous of degree one in p.
When private firms optimize, they take into account the environment in
which they operate. One of these environmental variables is the state of
technical knowledge, which, although typically exogenous to the firm, affectsPUBLIC INFRASTRUCTUR! CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Page13 -
itsproduction possibilities. Another environmental variable affecting
production relationships but exogenous to the firm is the amount of available
public infrastructure capital Ki. Since both the t and Ki variables affect
the production function, they also influence cost relationships. It is
therefore useful to specialize the Z inputs in the dual cost function (10) and
to re-write it as
C —g(Q,p,Kj,t). (11)
Among the n inputs, it is often the case that some inputs (such as
private capital stocks of structures and equipment) are fixed in the short-
run,whileother inputs (labor hours, energy, non-energy intermediate
materials) are variable. In this case, in the short-run firms optimize by
choosing those quantities of variable inputs that minimize total variable
input costs C,,, given Q,Pv'Xj, t K.?, where K is the private firm's
capital stock, p.,, is the set of input prices for the variable inputs, and C,,
is the sumofshort-run costs over the variable inputs. Following I'aul A.
Samuelson (1953], one can specify a short-run or variable private cost
function, written as
C,,, —h(Q.PvKpKi.t). (12)
A concept that will be of particular use to us in this paper is the
notion of the shadow value of the public infrastructure capital stock Kj.
Holding other things fixed, one can assess the impact on the private firm's
costs of there being an exogenous increase in the amount of available public
infrastructure capital, i.e., one can compute the marginal benefits to the
private sector (in terms of reduced costs) of there being an increase in K1.
For the total private cost function (11), define the shadow value of
infrastructure capital B as
B1 —- ÔC/aKj> 0, (13)PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Page14 -
andfor the variable private cost function (12), define the corresponding
shadow value Bj as
vi —- ac,/aKi>0. (14)
For the private sector firmminimizingshort-run variable costs, there
is also a shadow value relationship involving its private capital stock.
Accordingly, define the shadow value of private capital B as
—- 8Cj/ôKp> 0. (15)
If theprivatesector firm were in long-run equilibrium with respect to its
private inputs, then the marginal benefits of K would just equal its marginal
costs. Call the ex ante one-period price of private capital PK. Then at
this long-run equilbrium point, the optimal amount of private sector capital
K;isthat amount at which marginal benefits equal marginal costs, i.e..
—K; <—> — PK. (16)
Factors affecting the optimal provision of public (rather than private)
infrastructure capital }( are more complex, and may involve normative issues
of equity; for a discussion of issues underlying the optimal amount of public
goods, see the chapters of modern public finance textbooks, such as that by
Joseph Stiglitz [1986}. In the case of pure public goods, one could define
total marginal benefits of Kj capital as the sumofthe L,i shadow values over
all private sector firms, plus the sumofcorresponding marginal benefits over
all final consumers; call this social or total marginal benefit of K1 capital
B5. Alternatively, if there is no congestion in the consumption of public
goods, the total marginal benefit could be the largest benefit accruing to any
one or set of consumers, rather than the sumoverall consumers. One rather
simple notion of the optimal provision of Ki capital is that amount of
infrastructure capital 4forwhich social marginal benefits Bj just equalPUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Page15 -
marginalcosts P1(1, where PKi is the one-period social price of public
infrastructure capital Kj, i.e.,
Ki—4<—>8i8—PKi. (17)
One other result from duality theory will also be of importance to us.
By assumption, private sector firms choose quantities of variable inputs so as
to minimize private variable costs, given the constraints expressed in (12).
It turns out that the optimal, variable cost-minimizing quantities of the




This empirically useful result is typically knownasShephard's Lemma; for a
discussion end derivation, see W. Erwin Diewert (1974J.
In order to implement this theory of cost and production empirically,
and to estimate shadow values of private and public capital in Sweden, we must
gather appropriate data and specify mathematical functions for the cost
functions (11) and (12). To this we now turn our attention.
IV. Data and Econometric Inrnlementation
The production and input data used in this study consist of prices and
quantities for variable inputs (labor -L,energy -E,non-energy materials -
14),quantity estimates of the private sector capital stock K. and the public
infrastructure capital stock Ki, ex ante one-period or rental prices for
private (P5) and public infrastructure (P1(j) capital, and output quantity Q.
For this initial empirical analysis, we have employed data at two levels
of aggregation. First, for the private business sector, the measure of output
Q is value-added in constant 1985 prices; in this case, L is the only variable,
input. For the manufacturing sector, we also compute as a measure of output aPUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Page16 -
grossoutput series (sales plus net changes in inventories, adjusted for
inflation). When output is value added, the only variable input is L, and
with gross output, the variable inputs are L, E, M, and, in some cases, K.
For both the private business and the manufacturing sectors, the labor
quantity measure L is total hours worked, while P1 is total compensation to
employees plus employers' contributions to social security, all divided by L;
further details on data sources and construction procedures for the labor data
are given in Hansson (l99lc].
For manufacturing, the energy quantity index E is a Divisia quantity
index covering 18 different types of energy (mineral coal, coke, charcoal,
fuel wood, other types of fuel wood, propane and butane gas, petrol, paraffin
oil, diesel oil, four types of heating oils, town gas, and electricity). The
aggregate energy price index is then computed as total energy costs divided by
E. Non-energy intermediate materials are total intermediate materials minus
energy; total payments to non-energy intermediate materials in current and
constant currencies are computed by reversing the double deflation procedure
involving value-added and gross output. Further details on the E and M data
for the manufacturing sector are provided in Iiannson [l991c).
Aggregate capital input for the private sector is computed as a
Divisia quantity index of machinery and buildings stocks, with the share
weights employing ex ante rental prices of capital, calculated according to
the formula wk —q(r+6k)'where is the investment deflator for the kth
capital good, r is the five-year government bond yield, and is the constant
rate of depreciation for the kth type of capital asset. Note that at this
stage of our research, corporate taxes are not included in the rental price
measure.9 Capital stocks for buildings and machinery are computed separately
using the perpetual inventory method, with depreciation rates set to equalPUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Page17-
thosereported by Hulten and Wykoff [1980,1981).b0 For the manufacturing
sector, gross investment series are available back to 1870, but for the entire
private business sector'1, consistent series are available only since 1950.
For the non-manufacturing sectors, 1950 benchmark capital stocks are computed
separately by sector, calculated as a number no larger than 1/6k) times the
average investments for the first three years in the 1950's. The aggregate
rental price P5 is computed as total expenditures on private capital divided
by the Divisia quantity index 5.Furtherdetails on the construction of the
aggregate 5andP5 are found in Hansson (1991cJ.
Aggregate public infrastructure capital Ki is computed as a Divisia
quantity index of machinery and building stocks, with share weights reflecting
cxanterental prices as noted above; in particular, the government bond yield
is employed as the measure of r. The core public infrastructure capital stock
includes streets, roads and highways (central and local governments), mass
transit, airports, sewers and water systems, railroads and electric
facilities. Depreciation rates for individual asset types in the public
sector were set to the same value as in the private sector, except that road
maintenance was depreciated at 25% per annum. The 1960-88 time series of Kj
is presented in Table A-i in the appendix to this paper.
In 1960 (1988), the aggregate public infrastructure capital stock in
Sweden consisted of the following sector-specific distribution: electricity
generation and distribution, 40.8% (49.2)1; water systems and sewers, 4.1%
(7.5%); railway transport, 34.6% (20.6%); urban, suburban and interurban
passenger transport, 3.3% (3.1%); air transport, 1.4% (3.4%); streets, roads
and highways, 15.7% (16.1%). Since the electricity share is so large, and
since private sector consumers purchase electricity services, we have
constructed an alternative measure of the aggregate public infrastructurePUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Page18 -
capitalstock that excludes the electricity generation and distribution
sector. The 1960-88 time series of Ki excluding electricity is also given in
Table A-i in the appendix to this paper.
In terms of econometric implementation, our immediate task is to specify
functional forms for the variable cost functions such as (11) and (12). The
specifications we employ differ depending on the measure of output employed.
In particular, when value-added is the measure of output (as it is in the case
of the private business sector), the only variable input is labor, and in this
case the variable cost function reduces to an input requirement function
relating labor input to Q, K. K, and t. However, when gross output is used
as the measure of output (it and value-added are alternative measures of
output in the manufacturing sector), the variable cost function becomes more
complex, incorporating not only Q, 5,Kjand t, but also prices of the
variable inputs.
We begin with the specification for value-added output. One convenient
functional form for the labor input requirement function is the following,
analogous to that considered in Hansson [1991aJ (the corresponding variable
cost function is simply obtained by multiplying both sides by PL):
L — +flQQ + tQtQ + + K + jKi + QKQ
+ jQKj•Q+ + + .5'fl11K/Q. (19)
For estimation, to avoid potential problems with heteroskedasticity, it is
useful to divide both sides of (19) by Q, thereby having L/Q as the dependent
variable in the estimation equation. Note that with this functional form, no
constraints are placed on long-run returns to scale. However, if one sets
—QQ
— — iQ—0,then there are long-run constant returns to scale overPUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Page19 -
allprivate and public inputs (Meade's unpaid factors model), and if one
instead sets L — — pq—
Ppi
—0,long-run constant returns to scale
occur for the private inputs (Meade's atmosphere model).
One convenient feature of the specification in (19) is that, using the
marginal benefit equal marginal cost conditions in (16) and (18), one can
solve for optimal amounts of 4 and 4, provided that in the latter case
one restricts benefits to those accruing to the private business sector (and
excludes those infrastructure benefits enjoyed by final demand consumers).
These optimal capital stock levels turn out to be
K; —
•[rE






+ + - +
+ PQQ)].
(21)
In the econometric implementation, an additive disturbance term is
appended to the L/Q equation based on (19), and it is assumed to be
independently and identically normally distributed. However, since Q could
possibly be jointly determined with L/Q, a Hausman specification test will be
undertaken to test for the correlation of the various transformations of Q
with the equation disturbance term)2
For the manufacturing sector, when value-added is the measure of output
we employ the same specification as for the private business sector, i.e.. thePUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Page20 -
L/Qversion of (19), However, when the gross output measure is employed in
manufacturing, inputs other than L are variable. In this case, several
specifactions are available.
One possibility, in the tradition of Dale W. Jorgenson [1986], is to
treat all the L, E, M and K inputs as variable, as in (11). Letting Q now be
gross output rather than value-added, following Hansson [199la) one can
specify the total (private) cost function to have the following normalized
general Leontief form, where —PK.++ E + PM and TC PKK + PLL + PEE
+ PMM:
TC —Q[PLLL+ EEE + + ppPK + 2•(PTE(PLPEY5
+ LPCPLP(p)+ EM(E"M+ EP(PEWP) + MP(PMPI(P))]
+ + EE + MM + pPK).Q'5 + (1LL + 1MM + fiiEE + fljpPKp)
(KjQY5 + (LtL + EtE + flMt1'M + flptw).Q''5 (22)
+ s.[fljKj + PttQ + + fljQQK1 + fltQtQ+ flitQ(KitQ)'5]
Using Shephard's Lemma as expressed in (18), we can derive cost-minimizing
demands for the jth input, simply by differentiating (22) with respect to Pj.
This gives us four demand equations --forL, E, M and K. As an example, for
IL1, the cost-minimizing demand equation consistent with the total cost function
(22) is
* 5 5 5
—Q'Eflpp+ LP(PL/p) + PMP(PM/PKP)+ EP(PE/PKp)• +
+ Ptt + jQK I + + Q'5(K5 + PitQKi t'5Q'5) + flQQQ
+Q"5•(, + Qt).
(23)
Demand equations for L, E and M can be derived analogously.
For econometric implementation, an additive disturbance term is appended
to each of the five equations (the cost function (22), the demand equation forPUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Page21 -
privatecapital (23), and corresponding demand equations for L, E and H), and
the resulting disturbance vector is assumed to be independently and
identically multivariate normally distributed, with mean vector zero and
constant covariance matrix 0. Estimation can be carried out using the method
of maximum likelihood, with appropriate cross-equation parameter restrictions
imposed.
Note also that with this (private) cost total function (22), one can
compute the shadow value using (13); in this case, however, the benefits of
infrastructure capital consist of reduced costs over all the L, E, H and
inputs, not just over the L input as was the case in the value-added model
considered earlier.
Moreover, since energy demands are explicitly incorporated, to avoid
double-counting it is appropriate that the infrastructure capital stock be
re-defined in this gross output model as the previous core infrastructure
capital minus the electricity generation and distribution capital.
V. Results: The Private Business Sector in Sweden
We begin by reporting results when the Cobb-Douglas functional forms of
Aschauer and Munnell are employed, but with annual Swedish data for l964-88)
With no constraints placed on returns to scale, use of Aschauer's equation (2)
and 1964-88 annual data for Sweden resulted in the following estimated model:
in Q -in —-9.111+l.072•lnL -l.6661n+i.60l•inKj (25)
(2.92) (4.11) (5.58) (5.20)
+O.031•inCU +O.021•t R2 —0.979,SER—0.0151
(1.64) (3.60) DW —1.434
where numbers in parentheses are absolute values of t-statistics. Note that
although the 1.601 coefficient on in is positive and statistically
significant, it implies an elasticity of output with respect to Ki greaterPUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Page22 -
thanunity --hardlya credible result; the estimate of the labor elasticity
is also greater than unity, although its 1.072 value is considerably smaller.
Moreover, the -1.666 coefficient on In K implies a negative marginal product
for K capital, since the implicit estimated elasticity of output with respect
to K is -0.666. Finally, the estimated overall returns to scale consistent
with this Aschauer-type equation is 2.010 (1.072 -1.666+1.601+1),which
is not a plausible result. We conclude that estimating a Cobb-Douglas
production function equation as Aschauer did but using Swedish data results in
an equation that does not make much sense, even though the estimated
coefficient on ln K is positive and statistically significant.14'15
As we noted in Section II, the Cobb-Douglas functional form used by
Alicia Munneli (1990aJ is related to Aschauer's specification, but it excludes
the time variable. Based on Swedish private business sector annual data from
1964 through 1988, we obtained the following OLS equation:'6
in Q -inL —-4.298-0.596•lnL +0.369•lnK +0.687•lnK1 (26)
(1.21) (2.58) (3.71) (3.12)
+0.075•lnCU R2 —0.995,SER —0.019
(4.21) DW —0.874
Here the implied elasticity of output with respect to infrastructure capital
is smaller than above but still very large (0.687, and statistically
significant), the elasticity with respect to K is more reasonable at 0.369,
and that with respect to labor (-0.596 +1—0.404)is somewhat small when
compared to that for labor. The implied overall returns to scale estimate
based on (26) is 1.460; this is not significantly different from unity, for
the restriction of Meade's unpaid factors model is not rejected (x2 test
statistic of 1.92, and a 0.05 critical value of 3.84), nor is the restriction
rejected for Meade's atmosphere model (constant returns to scale for private
inputs only), where the test statistic is 1.46.17PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURECAPITALIN SWEDEN -Page23 -
Weconclude1 therefore, that although results obtained from Munnell's
specification are a vriori more plausible than those resulting from use of
Aschauer's model, the Munnell model implies a very large elasticity of output
with respect to infrastructure capital.18 Moreover, as we noted at the end of
Section III, the Aschauer and Munnell Cobb-Douglas production function
specifications have serious drawbacks, not only in terms of econometric
specification (e.g., they ignore the endogeneity of labor demand), but also by
not taking into account the optimizing behavior of firms. Recent developments
in duality theory have helped overcome these drawbacks.
We now turn to results obtained when we estimated parameters of a dual
restricted variable cost function, in particular, equation (19) with both









(4.79) (4.15) (4.18) (3.87) (2.76)
with an R2 of 0.9995, a SER of 0.00012,and a Durbin-Watson test statistic of
2.146. Since one might argue that this specification could suffer from a
simultaneous equations bias due to Q being endogenous, we performed a Hausrnan
specication test and checked whether the various right-hand variables
involving Q were correlated with the equation disturbance term. The chi-
square test statistic we obtained was 7.52, which is considerably lessthan
the 0.10 (12.0) and 0.05 (14.1) critical values with seven degrees of freedom;
hence we do not reject the null hypothesis that Q is exogenous.19
In terms of returns to scale specifications, the restrictions implied by
long-run constant returns to scale over all inputs (Meade's unpaid factors
model) are decisively rejected (the x2 test statistic is 93.60, while the 0.05PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Page24 -
criticalvalue with four restrictions is 9.49), as are the restrictions
implied by long-run constant returns to scale over private inputs only (the
test statistic is 109.93, and a 0.05 critical value of 9.49).
As is seen in (27), the L/Q input-output coefficient is affected by 5
and K in a nonlinear fashion. We have computed the short-run elasticity of
demand for private labor with respect to private capital, and with respect to
public capital, that are implied by these parameter estimates. These short-
run elasticity estimates vary considerably over the sample, even in sign. All
that can be said in general is that during the 1960's and late 1980's, private
labor and private capital were short-run substitutable inputs (the estimated
elasticity of L with respect 5 was negative), while private labor and public
capital were short-run complementary inputs (the estimated elasticity of L
with respect to K was positive);20 during the 1970's and up to the mid
1980's, the signs were reversed.
Of particular interest to us is the calculation of the optimal private
and optimal public infrastructure capital stocks implied by equating the
estimated shadow values (marginal benefits) of these stocks to their ex ante
rental prices, as formulated in equations (16), (17), (20) and (21). We have
computed these optimal capital stocks, and have then calculated the ratio of
the optimal capital stock K* to the actual capital stock K, by year for 5 and
for Kj. Results of this calculation are presented in Table 2 below.
Before discussing these estimates, we believe it useful to remind
readers that in the case of the public infrastructure capital Kj, use of (17)
and (21) implies that the optimal amount of Ku called 4, is that amount
that can be rationalized given that benefits (in terms of reduced labor Costs)
accrue only to the private business sector. To the extent that benefits
computed in this way are understated (since any benefits to final consumersPUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Page25 -
arenot incorporated), ceteris paribus, the ratio of K to Ki is also
understated. Moreover, since the optimal private capital stock K;rises
with decreases in the one-period rental price of private capital PK.ceteris
Daribus, to the extent that PK.isoverstated owing to the fact that corporate
taxes are not incorporated into the measure of PK(andon this see footnote
9), the ratio of K;toIç is understated. Hence, there is some reason to
Table 2
Ratios of Optimal to Actual Capital Stocks
Private Business Sector, Sweden, 1960-88
Yeat- K*/K K/K K;/KK/K
1960 1.030 1.044 1975 0.984 0.943
1961 1.057 1.041 1976 0.949 0.933
1962 1.055 1.033 1977 0.874 0.887
1963 1.072 1.048 1978 0.872 0.883
1964 1.089 1.064 1979 0.892 0.887
1965 1.067 1.047 1980 0.889 0.888
1966 1.033 1.021 1981 0.853 0.874
1967 1.030 1.017 1982 0.844 0.870
1968 1.021 0.987 1983 0.850 0.868
1969 1.037 0.987 1984 0.877 0.879
1970 1.067 1.000 1985 0.867 0.874
1971 1.033 0.975 1986 0.871 0.896
1972 1.022 0.965 1987 0.860 0.896
1973 1.032 0.963 1988 0.845 0.905
1974 1.016 0.957
believe that both of these ratios are understated. However, if the bias can
plausibly be argued to be relatively constant over time, the time trend in
these ratios can still provide useful information.
We begin with the ratio of optimal to actual private sector capital
stocks. As is seen in Table 2, this ratio is above unity and increases fromPUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURZ CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Page26 -
1960to 1964, it stays above unity but falls and then increases until 1970,
and then it begins falling more steadily, hitting levels below unity in 1975;
at the end of the time period in 1988, the ratio had fallen to 0.845, implying
that in 1988 the existing capital was underutilized, and that a capital stock
about 15% smaller is all that could be rationalized by the marginal benefit
equal marginal cost condition in the Swedish private business sector.
For the public infrastructure capital, the ratio of optimal to actual
capital stocks is above unity from 1960 until 1967. it hits a peak of 1.064 in
1964, it falls from 1970 to about 1983, and then rises slightly at the end of
the 1980's, reaching a level of 0.905 in 1988. Hence, if one incorporates as
benefits of K1 only those reduced labor costs accruing to the private business
sector in Sweden, in 1988 the level of K1 was about 9% too large. The extent
of such apparent excess infrastructure capital was falling in the late 1980's,
however, from 13% in 1983 to 9% in 1988, consistent with the widely held view
that, for example, roads and highways were not as well maintained as had been
the case in the 1970's and early 1980's.
Finally, to assess the effects on private sector productivity growth of
changes in the public infrastructure capital stock, we have undertook several
historical and counterfactual simulations. Specifically, we first computed
"actual" private business sector multifactor productivity (MFP) growth using
historical data on output growth minus growth in aggregate input, where actual
K.1, growth is weighted by the ex ante rental price of capital PK.1,; we call this
actual growth series MFPa.
Second, to purge from this MFPa series the effects of K not being in
long-run equilibrium, we used the historical dataserieson PK.L' Qtand
K1, as well as parameter estimates from (27), to compute optimal private
* * *
capital K; we then calculated the corresponding optimal L given K. Q, tPUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Page27 -
andK1. Finally, we constructed the corresponding aggregate input series over
L* and 4 using the Divisia index procedure, and then we obtained an MFP
series as growth in output minus growth in this long-run equilibrium but
counterfactual aggregate input. We call this private sector equilibrium
productivity series MFPe, reflecting the fact that it simulates private sector
productivity growth had it been in long-run equilibrium. Note that any
differences between MFP5 and MFPe reflect the effects of the private sector
capital stock being out of long-run equilibrium.
Third, there are several alternative ways by which one might investigate
the effects on private sector MFP of varying growth paths of infrastructure
capital Kj. For example, one could fix for the entire 1960-88 sample the
ratio of K1 to Q from some chosen year (say, 1960. 1974 or 1988), generate a
counterfactual K series given historical growth in Q, calculate private
** 8
sector long-run optimal K. and L given this new I(i series, and then
compute the implied rate of MFP growth. While interesting, these results
would vary with choice of the benchmark year (1960, 1974 or 1988), and thus
interpretation would be problematic. This consideration led us to employ as
an alternative K1 series that amount of K1 that could be rationalized by
private business sector cost savings, i.e. we solved (20) and (21) to obtain
4 an4,inserted these values into (19) to obtain L*, and then computed
MFP growth as growth in output minus growth in this counterfactual but optimal
aggregate private input; we call this optimal productivity growth series MFP0.
The results of our calculations are presented in Table 3 below. In the
first row of Table 3, it is seen that the slowdown in actual MFP growth from
1960-73 (an AACR of 4.290%) to 1974-88 (1.188%) was 72.3% ((4.290 -1.188)
/4.290). From the second row we see that had the private sector capital stock
been in long-run equilibrium in each year, then the slowdown would have beenPUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Page28 -
65.2% ratherthan 72.3% of 1960-73 actual MFP growth, or 9.8% smaller; thus
9.8% of the slowdown can be Nexplained by private sector capital stock
disequilibrium.
Table 3
MFP Average Annual Growth Rates Under Alternative Assumptions
Private Business Sector, Sweden, Parameters from Eq. 27
(1) (2) (3) Percent Slowdown
MFP MFP Percent NExplainedR
Scenario Notation1960-73 1974-88 Difference Marginal Total
Actual MFPa 4.290 1.188 72.3%
Private Sector in
Long-Run Equilibrium MFPe 4.080 1.419 65.2% 9.8% 9.8%
Private Sector in
Long-Run Equilibrium
and Optimal 4 MFP0 3.920 1.538 60.8% 6.1% 15.9%
Note: Column (3) computed as [(Column 2 -Column1)/Column 1].
In the bottom row of Table 3 we report HFP growth had the public
infrastructure capital been optimal (Kj —4),as viewed through private
business sector cost savings. There it is seen that had Kj —4,then
private sector long-run optimal MFP growth would have been lower from 1960 to
1973 (3.920% vs. 4.290%), it would have been higher from 1974 to 1988 (1.538%
vs. 1.188%), and thus the MFP growth slowdown would have been 60.8%, rather
than the actual 72.3%. The marginal impact of optimal 4, assuming private
sector long-run equilibrium, is to reduce the slowdown by 6.1% ((0.652 -
0.608)/0.723),and the cumulative impact of private and public sector
disequilibrium is to reduce the private sector MFP growth slowdown by 15.9%
((0.723 -0.608)/0.723).PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Page29 -
Weconclude, therefore, that while reduced infrastructure capital
investmentin Sweden since 1974 has contributed to the productivity growth
slowdown in the private business sector, this impact has been rather modest.21
Much of the productivity growth slowdown is apparently still "unexplained",
although Hanssons (l991b) results provide intriguing evidence that reduced
exploitation of scale economies may have played a very prominent role.
This completes our discussion of empirical results obtained for the
private business sector. We now provide some preliminary, more detailed
evidence using data from one sector within the aggregate private business
sector, namely, the manufacturing sector.
VI.Results: The Hanufacturin Sector in Sweden
Using annual 1960-1988 data for the Swedish manufacturing sector only,
we have estimated by ordinary least squares parameters of the labor demand
equation (19), where both sides are divided by value-added output Q. The










(1.85) (2.39) (1.78) (0.03) (1.73)
with an R2 of 0.9995, a SER of 0.000l2,and a Durbin-Watson test statistic of
1.906.
In terms of returns to scale specifications, the restrictions implied by
long-run constant returns to scale over all inputs (Meade's unpaid factors
model) are also decisively rejected in the manufacturing sector (the test
statistic is 78.63, while the 0.05 critical value with four restrictions is
9.49), as are the restrictions implied by long-run constant returns to scalePUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Page30 -
overprivate inputs only (the x2 test statistic is 68.54, and a 0.05 critical
value of 9.49).
Table 4
Ratios of Optimal to Actual Capital Stocks, Value Added Model
Manufacturing Sector Only, Sweden, 1960-88
K;/K K/Ki X!!
K*/K
1960 0.960 1.111 1975 0.851 0.774
1961 0.978 1.079 1976 0.828 0.779
1962 0.980 1.057 1977 0.765 0.762
1963 0.992 1.051 1978 0.766 0.766
1964 0.994 1.030 1979 0.773 0.762
1965 0.968 0.994 1980 0.764 0.759
1966 0.936 0.954 1981 0.731 0.758
1967 0.934 0.930 1982 0.718 0.763
1968 0.925 0.880 1983 0.719 0.768
1969 0.933 0.856 1984 0.733 0.771
1970 0.947 0.843 1985 0.721 0.769
1971 0.918 0.821 1986 0.726 0.789
1972 0.908 0.812 1987 0.708 0.770
1973 0.907 0.799 1988 0.690 0.760
1974 0.884 0.787
We have also computed optimal private and public capital stocks,
assuming that benefits in the form of reduced labor costs accrue only to the
manufacturing sector. Our estimates are given in Table 4 above. A number of
results are worth noting.
First, somewhat surprisingly, the ratio of optimal to actual private
capital in manufacturing is less than one in all years, with its high value of
0.994 in 1964 and a lowest value of 0.690 in 1988; although there are a few
wiggles in the late 1970's, this ratio falls rather steadily ever since 1970.
These results imply that in the Swedish manufacturing sector, the amount ofPUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Page31 -
underutilizationof capital is considerable, and that this underutilization
has increased in the last two decades.
With respect to public capital, a priori one would expect that if one
computed benefits as reduced labor costs for only the manufacturing sector,
the amount of public capital rationalized by this cost saving would be less
than if benefits included the entire private business sector. Hence, one
would expect the ratio of optimal to actual viewed from the vantage of the
manufacturing sector to be less than that when assessed from the viewpoint of
the entire private business sector. For the most part, this is what we find.
With the exception of the beginning years in the sample (1960.63), the ratio
of 4to is smaller in Table 4 (for manufacturing only) than in Table 2
(for the entire private business sector). As seen in Table 4, in 1988, this
ratio is but 0.760, while in Table 2 it is 0.905; hence the amount of excess
infrastructure capital is about 25% when benefits are confined to the
manufacturing sector, but only 10% when benefits include all components of the
private business sector. While one might question the magnitudes of these
estimated excess supplies of public infrastructure capital (and we certainly
view these estimates with considerable caution), we are heartened that their
relative sizes in the manufacturing and the entire private business sector are
for the most part consistent with prior expectations.
To this point we have only considered value-added measures of output.
As we noted in Section IV, when gross output becomes the measure of output,
variable inputs include not only L, but also E, M and K.,.In this case the
benefits of infrastructure capital are larger than simply labor savings, for
they include the entire reduction in variable costs. Recall that in Section
IV we discussed a gross output specification in which all private inputs (L,PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Page32 -
E,H and K) were considered variable -- aspecification we called a total
(private) cost function.
Table 5
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Cross Output Total Cost Fucntion
Swedish Manufacturing, 1960-88
(Absolute Value of Ratio of Parameter Estimate to Asymptotic
Standard Error in Parentheses)
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate
-0.191E-3 LE -0.277E-2 Lt O.670E-3
(2.71) (6.47) (0.20)
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-0.542 fljp 1.074 ln L —- 1130.41
(1.65) (3.89)
Using annual manufacturing data for Sweden from 1960 to 1988. we have
estimated by maximum likelihood parameters of the total cost function (22).
the demand equation (23). and corresponding demand equations for L, 5 and
M. Parameter estimates from this model are reported in Table 5 above.PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Page33 -
Althoughit is difficult to interpret parameter estimates directly, all
but six of the estimated 28 parameters are larger in absolute value than their
estimated asymptotic standard errors. In terms of returns to scale, the
restrictions corresponding with constant returns to scale over all inputs
(Meade's unpaid factors model) are decisively rejected; the likelihood ratio
test statistic is 85.5. while the 0.01 critical value with seven degreees
of freedom is 18.5; similarly, the null hypothesis of constant returns to
scale over private inputs only is also rejected decisively, for the test
statistic is 139.9, while the 0.01 critical value with twelve degrees of
freedom is 26.2.
The parameter estimates in Table 5 can be employed to compute various
elasticities and shadow value relationships. In 1975. the approximate mid-
point of the sample, the short-run elasticities of demand for variable inputs
with respect to changes in the quantity of Ki capital are estimated to be
-0.60 for L, 0.02 for M, 1.39 for E and 0.86 for 5. Using (13), we have also
computed the amount of K capital rationalized by the cost savings accruing to
the manufacturing sector, called 4, and divided it by the actual K value;
the ratio of optimal to actual Ki capital is presented in Table 6 below, as
are corresponding ratios for 5 capital, which in this case is assumed to be a
variable input.
As in seen in Table 6, for the private capital input 5, the ratio of
optimal to actual 5 is on average about unity, and it has a U-shaped tine
trend, above unity at the beginning of the sample, a minimum value of 0.037 in
1978, and then it rises at the end of the sample. This U-shaped pattern
implies of course an autocorrelated residual, which in turn might reflect a
misspecification in treating 5 as a variable rather than a quasi-fixed input.PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Page34 -
Table6
Ratios of Optimal to Actual Capital Stocks, Cross Output Total Cost Model
Manufacturing Sector Only. Sweden, 1960-88
* * * *
K/K K/K K/K K/K p p p p
1960 1.109 1.025 1975 0.994 0.852
1961 1.085 1.023 1976 0.999 0.824
1962 1.085 1.001 1977 0.950 0.760
1963 1.079 0.978 1978 0.937 0.746
1964 1.090 0.987 1979 0.975 0.783
1965 1.090 0.997 1980 0.966 0.777
1966 1.061 0.974 1981 0.941 0.743
1967 1.041 0.955 1982 0.950 0.736
1968 1.010 0.953 1983 0.989 0.766
1969 1.012 0.967 1984 1.031 0.798
1970 1.016 0.966 1985 1.045 0.799
1971 0.993 0.933 1986 1.079 0.787
1972 0.993 0.918 1987 1.091 0.777
1973 1.009 0.922 1988 1.095 0.749
1974 1.024 0.910
For public infrastructure capital K1, the time trend of optimal to actual K1
is generally decreasing over time until about 1982, having a high value of
1.025 in 1960, a minimal value of 0.736 in 1982, and then wiggling a bit,
ending up at 0.749 in 1988. For the 1980's, the level of optimal to actual I(
from this total cost gross output model is surprisingly similar to that
obtained using the value added specification (see Table 4); in both cases, the
time trend indicates that viewed from the vantage of cost savings accruing
only to the manufacturing sector, the amount of excess public infrastructure
capital has decreased.PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Page35 -
VII.Concluding Remarks
Ourpurposein this paper has been to discuss alternative frameworks for
evaluating and measuring the contribution of public infrastructure capital in
Sweden on private sector output and productivity growth. We have reviewed the
theoretical and empirical models developed by Aschauer and by Munnell, who
have implemented them empirically using U.S. data. In our judgment, these
Cobb-Douglas production function models have a number of serious drawbacks.
When these models are estimated using Swedish data for the entire private
business sector and for the manufacturing sector, we obtain coefficient
estimates on public infrastructure capital that are statistically different
from zero, but do not make much sense.
We then implemented a number of dual cost function models, and found
that results were more plausible. In particular, although in each of the
Cobb-Douglas production and dual cost function models the constraints of
constant returns to scale over all inputs (Meade's unpaid factors model) are
rejected, as are the restrictions implied by constant returns to scale over
private inputs only (Meade's atmosphere model), we find that increases in
public infrastructure capital, ceteris paribus, reduce private costs. We have
computed that amount of public infrastructure capital that would rationalize
the cost savings incurred by the private business and manufacturing sectors,
and find that the amount that can be rationalized in this manner is less than
what is in fact available in 1988, but that the extent of excess public
infrastructure has been falling in the 1980's.
In interpreting these findings, we wish to offer several concluding
remarks. First, the benefits we have estimated are those only realized by the
private business sector (in some cases, the manufacturing sector), and do notPUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Fag.36-
incorporatethe cost and time savings of public infrastructure capital enjoyed
by final consumers. Second, our estimates of the cost of capital need further
work, not only to incorporate the effects of taxes22, but also in assessing
the sensitivity of our findings to alternative choices of the discount rate
for public projects.23 Third, in some preliminary analyses we have not been
able to obtain satisfactory results for a dynamic gross output model in the
manufacturing sector when private capital is a quasi-fixed input; further
research on this type of model could be very useful. Fourth, although our
model is already a bit rich in parameters given the sample size, it would seem
worthwhile investigating whether results could be sharpened when public
infrastructure capital is disaggregated, say, into roads and highways, other
transportation-related infrastructure capital, and all other public
infrastructure capital. Finally, although our analysis has focused on
implications for cost savings to the private sector of changes in public
infrastructure capital stock, we have neglected entirely any discussion of the
optimal pricing of such publicN or NnearpublicR goods; as Clifford Winston
[19911 has recently emphasized, this too is an important and closely related
issue.PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURECAPITALIN SWEDEN -Page37 -
FOOTNOTES
'Forother recent discussions, see Charles R. Hulten and Robert M. Schwab
(1991), Catherine J. Morrison and AmyE.Schwartz [1991), John A. Tatom
[1991), and Dale V. Jorgenson [1991].
2This issue has also been of considerable interest recently in the policy
arena. See, for example, Svenska Vugfureningen [1990).
3For references, see the citations in Alicia Munneil [l990a,b), Kaven T. Deno
(1988], Jacob De Rooy [1978] and Koichi Mera (1973]. For a more general
discussion, see V. Erwin Diewert [1980, 1986).
1'Yet another notion of external economies involving spillovers among private
sectors has been considered by Ricardo J. Caballero and Richard K. Lyons
[1989].
5For important studies in this context, see Robert E. Hall [1988a,b], Paul
Romer [1986] and Catherine 3. Morrison (1989].
6Aschauer's estimated productivity equation (3) has the form
in A —-0.72-0.36•lnL -0.09ln+0.34•(lnKi -ln
K,)
(1.39) (3.82) (0.98) (9.20)
+0.45•lnCU +0.i0•t R2 —0.998,SER—0.0079
(11.15) (4.75) DV —1.73
which indicates that increases in in 1(, ceteris paribus, have a strong and
significant positive impact on multifactor productivity.
7lnterestingiy, although Aschauer considers the simultaneous equations bias
issue, he focuses on the correlation of Kj with the equation disturbance term,
which could occur if current government spending "surprises: affected both Q
and K. Aschauer re-estimates his equations by two-stage least squares using
lagged Ki as an instrument, and finds his results are essentially the sameas
those obtained by OLS.
8For a review of recent developments in the econometric implementation of
models of cost and production, see Berndt [1991], especially chapter 9,
"Modeling the Interrelated Demands for Factors of Production: Estimation and
Inference in Equation Systems".
91n private conversations with Jan Sodersten, we have learned that in many
cases, assuming the marginal corporate tax rate is zero may well be a
realistic assumption.
'°For a discussion of measurement issues involved in constructing capital
stocks, see, among others, Berndt [1991), especially chapter 6, section 1,
"Investment and Capital Stock: Definitions and General Framework."
The private business sector is an aggregate of agriculture, mining,
manufacturing, construction, wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and
hospitals, parking and leasing, other passenger land transport, freight
transport by road, water transport, supporting services to land transport,
post office services, telecommunications, financial institutions, insurance
and letting of other premises, business services and personal services.PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Fag.38 -
12SeeHausman [1978) for anelaboration on this teat.
'3Thedata begin in 1964 rather than 1960 since time series on CU in Sweden
are not available before 1964.
'4The returns to scale restriction in Meade's atmosphere (constant returns to
scale in private inputs K. and L) specification is decisively rejected, for
the x2 test statistic with 1 degree of freedom is 24.1468, much larger than
the critical value at any reasonable level of significance. Similarly.
Meade's unpaid fact2r (constant returns to scale in all inputs) model is also
rejected, for the XL test statistic with 1 degree of freedom is 16.1924, which
also is larger than the critical value at usual significance levels. Finally,
since the Durbin-Watson test statistic was in the inconclusive region, we
estimated this equation using the maximum likelihood procedure with an AR(].)
stochastic disturbance specification. The unsatisfactory results remained.
Specifically, the coefficients (absolute values of t-statistics) on ln L,
ln and in Kj were, respectively, 0.856 (3.05), -1.402 (4.23) and 1.278
(3.77).
15WheninK1 was excluded entirely as an input, the estimated returns to scale
fell to 0.773.
t6The results we obtained were much more reasonable when In CU was employed
rather than CU.
17w1th in Ki is excluded entirely, the estimated returns to scale fall
drastically to 0.484.
18Results deteriorate further when an AR(l) model is estimated.
19The instruments used in the first-stage regression of 2SLS include in
addition to the constant term, t, K1,, and K1, real gross domestic product in
Europe, real gross domestic product in the US, the 5-year Swedish government
bond yield, total hours worked in the local government sector, and total hours
worked in the central government sector, as well as nonlinear transforms of
these variables.
20Note that these substitutability, complementarity relationships are similar
to those reported by Munneil [l990b], based on the translog production
function.
210ne can also compute the elasticity of private sector multifactor
productivity growth with respect to changes in the stock in public
infrastructure capital; this elasticity varies by year, and in our sample it
ranges from a low of 0.058 in 1960 to a high of 0.171 in 1985; in 1988, the
last year of our sample, this elasticity was 0.149, very similar to the 0.15
elasticity reported by Munnell [1990bJ in her pooled cross-section, time
series estimation using US data by state.
22 this, however, see footnote 9.
23There is a very large literature on this issue. For a recent discussion,
see Robert C. Lind [1982].PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE CAPITAL IN SWEDEN -Page39 -
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TableA-i
Capital Stock Estimates for Sweden, 1960-1988
Millions of Swedish Kroner in 1985 Prices
Private BusinessPrivate Mfg Public Core Public Core but
Sector -Total Sector 0n1P InfrastructureExcluding Elec.
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1975 565474 247047 304837 183516
1976 590937 258217 310347 184527
1977 614495 268753 317334 186327
1978 628491 271700 323503 187371
1979 631312 269355 326937 187464
1980 641328 268415 328151 187085
1981 661112 272391 330711 186328
1982 672306 274157 332923 183989
1983 681728 271939 337471 182571
1984 695476 270904 342773 181689
1985 714878 273613 347606 181187
1986 748615 284016 350233 179494
1987 778376 293095 353995 180979
1988 816769 305794 355170 181407